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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs)-powered Electro-
cardiogram (ECG) diagnosis systems recently
achieve promising progress to take over tedious ex-
aminations by cardiologists. However, their vul-
nerability to adversarial attacks still lack compre-
hensive investigation. The existing attacks in im-
age domain could not be directly applicable due
to the distinct properties of ECGs in visualization
and dynamic properties. Thus, this paper takes a
step to thoroughly explore adversarial attacks on
the DNN-powered ECG diagnosis system. We an-
alyze the properties of ECGs to design effective
attacks schemes under two attacks models respec-
tively. Our results demonstrate the blind spots of
DNN-powered diagnosis systems under adversarial
attacks, which calls attention to adequate counter-
measures.
1 Introduction
In common clinical practice, the ECG is an important tool
to diagnose a wide spectrum of cardiac disorders, which
are the leading health problem and cause of death world-
wide by statistics [World Health Organization, 2018]. There
are recent high-profile examples of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs)-powered approaches achieving parity with human
cardiologists on ECG classification and diagnosis [Awni Y
et al., 2019; IEEE-Spectrum, 2018; Kiranyaz et al., 2016;
Al Rahhal et al., 2016]. Given enormous costs of healthcare,
it is tempting to replace expensive manual ECG examining of
cardiologists with a cheap and highly accurate deep learning
system. In recent, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
has granted clearance to several deep learning-based ECG di-
agnostic systems such as AliveCor, Biofourmis and Lepu.
With DNN’s increasing adoption in ECG diagnosis, its po-
tential vulnerability to ‘adversarial examples’ also arouses
great public concern. The state-of-the-art literature has shown
that to attack a DNN-based image classifier, an adversary can
construct adversarial images by adding almost imperceptible
perturbations to the input image. This misleads DNNs to mis-
classify them into an incorrect class [Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017].
Such adversarial attacks would pose devastating threats to
the DNN-powered ECG diagnosis system. On one hand, ad-
versarial examples fool the system to give incorrect results so
that the system fails to serve the purpose of diagnosis assis-
tance. On the other hand, adversarial examples would breed
medical frauds. The DNNs’ outputs are expected to be uti-
lized in other decision-making in medical system [Finlayson
et al., 2018], including billing and reimbursement between
hospitals/physicians and insurance companies. Large institu-
tions or individual actors may exploit the system’s blind spots
on adversarial examples to inflate medical costs (e.g., exag-
gerate symptoms) for profit1.
To our knowledge, previous literature on DNN model at-
tacks mainly focus on the image domain, and has yet to thor-
oughly discuss the adversarial attacks on ECG recordings. In
this paper, we identify the distinct properties of ECGs, and
investigate two types of adversarial attacks for DNN-based
ECG classification system.
In Type I Attack, the adversary can access the ECG record-
ings and corrupt them by adding perturbations. Such ad-
versary could be a cardiologist who purposely manipulates
patient’s ECGs to get more reimbursement from the insur-
ance company. We found that simply applying exiting image-
targeted attacks on ECG recordings generates suspicious ad-
versarial instances, because commonly-used Lp norm in im-
age domain to encourage visual imperceptibility is unsuitable
for ECGs (see Figure 4). In visualization, each value in an
ECG represents the voltage of a sample point which is vi-
sualized as a line curve. Meanwhile, each value in a image
represents the grayscale or RGB value of a pixel which is vi-
sualized as the corresponding color. Humans have different
perceptual sensitivities to colors and line curves. As shown
in Fig. 1, when two data arrays are visualized as line curves,
their differences are more prominent rather than those visual-
ized as gray-scale images. In this paper, we propose smooth-
ness metrics to quantify perceptual similarities of line curves,
and leverages them to generate unsuspicious adversarial ECG
instances.
In Type II Attack, the adversary would corrupt ECGs via
physical process like EMI signal injection [Kune et al., 2013],
which injects the desired perturbation to the on-the-fly sig-
nals. In this case, the adversary may not be able to access the
1Cardiologist convicted in fountain of youth billing fraud scam
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Figure 1: Perception test. There are two data arrays in the range of
[−1, 1], and the second one is obtained by adding a few perturba-
tions with 0.1 amplitude to the first one. Both of them are visualized
as line curves and gray-scale images.
ECGs directly or they want to fool the system without leav-
ing digital tampering footage. Different from images, ECGs
have periodicity property and it is hard to determine the exact
sampling point of the on-the-fly ECGs. The possible skewing
may make the perturbation intended for signal peaks added
onto signal troughs. Moreover, filtering, as a standard process
in most ECG devices to combat noise, may impair the effect
of perturbation. In addition, ECGs are likely to be regarded
as private data and only stored in local device for privacy. In
this paper, we explicitly consider the possible skewing and fil-
tering in the attack scheme to generate filtering-resistant per-
turbations that are effective for the on-the-fly ECGs, and the
perturbations obtained based on some leaked instances can be
applicable on other unseen ones as well.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• This paper thoroughly investigate adversarial attacks for
DNN-based ECG classification systems. We identify the
distinct properties of ECGs to facilitate designing ef-
fective attack schemes under two attack models respec-
tively.
• We propose a smoothness metric to effectively quantify
human perceptual distance on line cures, which quanti-
fies the pattern similarity in a computationally-efficient
way. Adversarial attacks using the smoothness metric
achieve a 99.9% success attack rate. In addition, we
conduct an extensive human perceptual study on both
ordinary people and cardiologists to evaluate the imper-
ceptibility of adversarial ECG instances.
• We model the sampling point uncertainty of the on-the-
fly ECGs and the filtering effect within the adversar-
ial generation scheme. The generated perturbations are
skewing-resistant and filtering-resistant to tamper with
on-the-fly signals (99.64% success rate), and generalize
well in unseen examples.
2 Background
In this section, we first introduce the victim DNN-based ECG
classification system for attack scheme evaluation, then we
illustrate its threat models.
2.1 Victim DNN-powered ECG Diagnosis Model
We apply our attack strategies to the DNN-based arrhythmia
classification system [Rajpurkar et al., 2017; Andreotti et al.,
2017; Awni Y et al., 2019]. An arrhythmia is defined as any
rhythm other than a normal rhythm. Early and accurate de-
tection of arrhythmia types is important for detecting heart
diseases and choosing appropriate treatment for a patient. If
the detection algorithm is mislead to classify an arrhythmia as
a normal rhythm, the patient may miss the optimal treatment
period. Conversely if a normal rhythm is misclassified as an
arrhythmia, the patient may accept unnecessary consultation
and treatment, which would result in a waste of medical re-
sources or medical frauds.
The original model [Rajpurkar et al., 2017] adopts 34-
layer Residual Networks (ResNet) [He et al., 2016] to clas-
sify a 30s single-lead ECG segment into 14 different classes.
However, their dataset and trained model are not public.
In the Physionet/Computing in the Cardiology Challenge
2017 [Clifford et al., 2017], [Andreotti et al., 2017] repro-
duced the approach by [Rajpurkar et al., 2017] on the PhyDB
dataset and achieved a good performance. The model is
the representative of the current state-of-the-art in arrhythmia
classification. Both their algorithm and model are available
in open source. The model architecture is shown in Figure 2.
PhyDB dataset consists of 8,528 short single-lead ECG seg-
ments labeled as 4 classes: normal rhythm(N), atrial fibrilla-
tion(A), other rhythm(O) and noise(∽). Both atrial fibrilla-
tion and other rhythm indicates arrhythmia. Atrial fibrillation
is the most prevalent cardiac arrhythmia. “Other rhythm” in
the dataset refers to other abnormal arrhythmia except atrial
fibrillation. For note, the accuracy of this model is not 100%
on the PhyDB dataset. Thus, to prove the effectiveness of
the proposed attacks, we only generate adversarial examples
for those ECGs originally correctly classified by the model
without attacks (shown in Table 2, 6081 ECGs in total) .
Figure 2: Architecture of Victim Model.
2.2 Threat Models
Type I Attack
The adversary has access to ECG recordings. One possi-
ble case is a cardiologist who can access patients’ ECGs
and have monetary incentive to manipulate them to fool the
checking system of insurance companies. Another possible
case is a hacker who intercept and corrupt data to attack a
cloud-deployed ECG diagnosis system for fun or profit. That
data may be uploaded from portable patches like Life Sig-
nal LP1100 or householdmedical instruments like Heal Force
ECG monitor to the cloud-deployed algorithms for analysis.
For both cases, the adversary aims to engineer ECGs so that
the ECG classification system is mislead to give the diagnosis
that he/she desires, and in the meanwhile, the data perturba-
tions should be sufficiently subtle that they are either imper-
ceptible to humans, or if perceptible, seems natural and not
representative of an attack.
It is worth mentioning the difference between adversarial
attacks and simple substitution attacks. In substitution at-
tack, the adversary replaces the victim ECG with ECG of
another subject with the target class. However, the ECGs,
as a kind of biomedical signs, are often unique to their own-
ers as fingerprint [Odinaka et al., 2012]. Thus, the simple
substitution attacks can be effectively defended if the system
checks input ECGs against prior recordings from the same
patient. However, the adversarial attacks only add subtle per-
turbations without substantially altering the personal identi-
fier (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Adversarial Attack v.s. Substitution attack
Type II Attack
The adversary would corrupt ECGs via physical process like
EMI signal injection [Kune et al., 2013], which injects the de-
sired perturbation to the on-the-fly signals. One possible case
is a cardiologist who want to manipulate the system diagno-
sis without leaving digital tampering footage to avoid getting
caught. Another possible case is the adversary may not be
able to access the ECGs directly when the ECGs are mea-
sured and analyzed by the ECG classification model stored in
a local device. For both cases, the adversary aims to inject
the perturbation to the on-the-fly ECGs so that the success
probability of attacks to fool the system is maximized.
3 Related Works
Here we review recent works on adversarial examples, and
the existing arrhythmia classification systems.
3.1 Adversarial Examples
Recently, considerable attack strategies have been proposed
to generate adversarial examples. Attacks can be classified
into targeted and untargeted ones based on the adversarial
goal. The adversary of the former modifies an input to mis-
lead the targeted model to classify the perturbed input into a
chosen class, while the adversary of the latter make the per-
turbed input misclassified to any class other than the ground
truth. In this paper, we only focus on the more powerful tar-
geted attacks.
Based on the accessibility to the target model, the exist-
ing attacks fall into white-box and black-box attacks cate-
gories. In former manner, an adversary has complete access
to a classifier [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017;
Kurakin et al., 2018], while in latter manner, an adver-
sary has zero knowledge about them [Papernot et al., 2016;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016]. This paper
studies the white-box adversarial attacks to explore the upper
bound of an adversary to better motivate defense methods.
Besides, prior works [Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016]
have shown the transferability of adversarial attacks, i.e, train
a substitute model given black-box access to a target model,
and transfer the attacks to it by attacking the substitute one.
In the image domain, most works adopted Lp norm as ap-
proximations of human perceptual distance to constrain the
distortion. However, for ECGs in time-series format, people
focus more on the overall pattern/shape, which can not be
fully described by Lp norm [Eichmann and Zgraggen, 2015;
Gogolou et al., 2018] (see Section ‘Similarity Metrics’ for
details). Recent works [Kurakin et al., 2018; Athalye et al.,
2018b; Chen et al., 2018] have explored the robustness of the
adversarial examples in the physical world, where the input
images could not be precisely controlled, and may change un-
der different viewpoints, lighting and camera noise. Our strat-
egy on Type II attack is inspired by [Athalye et al., 2018b;
Brown et al., 2017]. Different from images, we deal with
sampling point uncertainty of the periodic ECGs and the fil-
tering function of ECG devices.
Recent works on GAN-based attacks [Xiao et al., 2018;
Song et al., 2018] focus on improve attacking efficiency to
image classification system, which can be combined with
metric computation efficiency of ECGadv in future work.
A workshop paper [Han et al., 2019] convolves perturba-
tion with Gaussian kernels for ECG adversarial attacks. Our
proposed smoothness metric and Gaussian kernels method
can be integrated to improve the system. Besides, our pa-
per further addresses the issues in physical ECG attacks. For
the emerging defense methods, [Athalye et al., 2018a] pro-
posed a general framework to circumvent several published
defenses based on randomly transforming the input. Thus,
we do not discuss defense breaking in this paper.
3.2 Arrhythmia Classification System
Considerable efforts have been made on automated arrhyth-
mia classification systems to take over tedious manual exam-
inations. Deep learning methods show great potential due to
their ability to automatically learn features through multiple
levels of abstraction, which frees the system from the depen-
dence on hand-engineered features. Recent works [Kiranyaz
et al., 2016; Al Rahhal et al., 2016; Awni Y et al., 2019]
started applying DNN models on ECG signals for arrhythmia
classification and achieved good performance. For any sys-
tem in the health-care field, it is crucial to defend against any
possible attacks since people’s lives rely heavily on the sys-
tem’s reliability. Prior work [Kune et al., 2013] has launched
attacks to pollute the measurement of cardiac devices by a
low-power emission of chosen electromagnetic waveforms.
The adversarial attacks and the injection attacks in [Kune et
al., 2013] complement each other. The injection attack can
inject the carefully-crafted perturbation generated by adver-
sarial attacks to perform targeted attacks to mislead the ar-
rhythmia classification system.
4 Technical Approach
In this section, we illustrate our attack strategies for two threat
models respectively.
4.1 Type I Attack Strategy
Problem Formulation
Given an m-class classifier, g : X → Y that accepts an input
x ∈ X and produces an output y ∈ Y . The output vector y,
treated as the probability distribution, satisfies 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
and
∑m
i=1 yi = 1. The classifier assigns the label C (x) =
argmaxig(x)i to the input x. Let C
∗(x) be the correct label
of x. Given a valid input x and a target class t 6= C ∗(x), an
adversary aims to generate adversarial examples xadv so that
the classifier predicts g(xadv) = t (i.e. successful attack),
and xadv and x are close based on the similarity metric (i.e.
visual imperceptibility). It can be modeled as a constrained
minimization problem as seen in prior works [Szegedy et al.,
2013]:
minimize D(x, xadv)
such that C (xadv) = t
(1)
where D is some similarity metric. It is worth mentioning
that there is no box constraints for time-series measurement.
It is equivalent to solve [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]:
minimize D(x, xadv) + c · fg(xadv) (2)
where fg is an objective function mapping the input to a pos-
itive number, which satisfies fg(xadv) ≤ 0 if and only if
C (xadv) = t. One common objective function is cross-
entropy. We adopt the one in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017].
fg(xadv) = (maxi6=t(Z(xadv)i)− Z(xadv)t)
+ (3)
where Z(x) = z is logits, i.e., the output of all layers except
the softmax. (e)+ is short-hand formax(e, 0).
Similarity Metrics
To generate adversarial examples, we require a distance met-
ric to quantify perceptual similarity to encourage visual im-
perceptibility. The widely-adopted distance metrics in the lit-
erature are Lp norms ‖xadv − x‖p, where the p-norm ‖ · ‖p
is defined as ‖v‖p = (
∑n
i=1 |vi|
p)
1
p . Lp norms focus on
the change in each pixel value. However, human percep-
tion on line curves focuses more on the overall pattern/shape.
Studies in [Eichmann and Zgraggen, 2015; Gogolou et al.,
2018] show that given a group of line curves for similarity as-
sessment, pattern-focused distance metrics like the Dynamic
time warping (DTW)-based ones produce rankings that are
closer to the human-annotated rankings than value-focused
metrics like Euclidean distances. Thus, we consider using
DTW to quantify the similarity of ECGs at first. However, the
non-differentiability and non-parallelism of DTWmake it ill-
suited for adversarial attacks. Recent work [Cuturi and Blon-
del, 2017] proposes a differentiable DTW variant, Soft-DTW.
However, Soft-DTW does not change the essence of DTW –
a standard dynamic programming problem. The value and
gradient of Soft-DTW would be computed in quadratic time,
and it is hard to leverage the parallel computing of the GPU
to speed it up.
To capture the pattern similarity in a computation-efficient
way, we adopt the followingmetric, denoted as smoothness as
our similarity metric. Given δ = xadv − x and var(·) refers
to variance calculation:
diff (δ) = δi − δi−1, i = 2, . . . , n
dsmooth(δ) = var(diff (δ))
(4)
Smoothness metric dsmooth quantifies the smoothness of
perturbation(δ) by measuring the variation of the difference
between neighbouring points of perturbation. The smaller
the variation, the smoother the perturbation. A smoother per-
turbation δ means that the adversarial instances x′ are more
likely to preserve a similar pattern to the original instance
x. In the extreme case where dsmooth = 0, δ should be a
constant and xadv = x + constant, i.e., the adversarial in-
stances xadv have the same shape as the original instance x.
It is worth mentioning that in our attack scheme, we inten-
tionally preserve the zero-mean and one-variance property of
the generated xadv, therefore the perturbation can not be eas-
ily filtered by the normalization layer of the system. Besides,
compared with the quadratic time complexity of Soft-DTW,
the smoothness metric can be computed in linear time, which
is efficient in principle. To further quantify the efficiency,
we run the adversarial attacks with different metrics: Soft-
DTW, smoothness metric and L2 norm. Both the computing
resources (AWS c5.2xlarge instances) and the victim ECGs
are the same. The average CPU time per iteration of different
metrics are shown in Table 1. The smoothness metric can be
further accelerated by GPU as L2 norm does.
Table 1: Computation Efficiency across Different Metrics
Metric dsoftdtw dsmooth dl2
CPU time/iteration 12.28s 0.05s 0.05s
4.2 Type II Attack Strategy
Problem Formulation
Given the same m-class classifier, g : X → Y as above, in
Type II attack, we explicitly consider the filtering process in
attack scheme. Filtering is a standard process in ECG devices
to combat noises before the data analysis, including baseline
wandering noises (<0.05Hz) and the power-line noises (50
or 60 Hz) [Luo and Johnston, 2010]. To generate filtering-
resistant perturbations, we constrain the power of the pertur-
bation within those filtered frequency bands during the opti-
mization procedure. We also consider the possible skewing
to generate perturbations that are effective for the on-the-fly
ECGs, since it is hard for the attacker to obtain the exact time
that the device begins measuring ECGs. Inspired by Expecta-
tion Over Transformation(EOT) [Athalye et al., 2018b], we
regard such uncertainty as a shifting transformation of the
original measurement and explicitly consider such a transfor-
mation within the optimization procedure.
Formally, given a distance function D(·, ·) and a chosen
distribution T of transformation function t, we have the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
minimize Et∈T [D(t(xadv), t(x))]+
c · Et∈T [− logP (yt|t(xadv))]
(5)
where xadv = x+ h(xperturb). xperturb is the added pertur-
bation and h(·) is a rectangular filter. Specifically, we trans-
form the xperturb from time domain to frequency domain via
Fast Fourier transform. We utilize a mask to zero the power
of frequency bins for less than 0.05Hz and 50/60Hz. Fi-
nally, inverse Fast Fourier transform will transform it back
to the time domain. Besides, we add a constraint ǫ1 <
Et∈T [D(t(xadv), t(x))] < ǫ2. ǫ1 is large enough that xadv
can have a large probability of successful attacks under most
shifting transformations. Since the ECG signals of the same
class share common pattern, a sufficiently large ǫ1 can im-
plicitly enable the universality of an adversarial sample, i.e., a
perturbation is effective on other unseen samples of the same
class. ǫ2 forces the adversarial examples to be within a certain
distance constraint of the original.
Perturbation Window Size
For adversarial attacks, it is better that the perturbation at-
tracts minimal attention of the victim. Thus, we introduce the
length of the perturbation wd as a parameter, which could be
set by the adversary and fixed during the perturbation gen-
eration. wd gives the system flexibility to control the added
perturbation. The intuition behind is that the smaller wd is,
the smaller the attack duration. Attack duration denotes the
time when the attacker try to inject the signal. It is obviously
that the less time the attacker stays active in the crime scene,
the less chance it will be perceived by the victim. Moreover,
the larger wd is, the generated perturbation has higher proba-
bility of having an effect on other unseen samples of the same
class(i.e., universality).
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate our attacks in two threat models
respectively2.
5.1 Evaluation for Type I Attack
Experiment Setup
We implement our attack strategy for Type I Attack un-
der the framework of CleverHans [Papernot et al., 2018].
We adopt the Adam optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with
0.005 learning rate to search for adversarial examples. We
compare the performance of three similarity metrics on ad-
versarial examples generation, given δ = xadv − x: (i)
dl2(δ) = ‖δ‖
2
2, (ii)dsmooth(δ) (Equation 4), (iii) dsmooth,l2(δ)
= dsmooth(δ) + k · dl2(δ), k = 0.01.
All metrics are evaluated under the same optimization
scheme with the same hyper-parameters. As said before, we
only attack ECGs that are originally correctly classified by
the model without attack. The profile of the attack dataset
is shown in Table 2. Here, “A, N, O, ∽” denote normal,
atrial fibrillation(AF), other rhythm and noise respectively.
The sampling rate of the ECGs is 300Hz, i.e., the length of
a 30s ECG is 9000.
2
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Table 2: Data profile for the attack dataset
Type Number
Time length (s)
mean std
Normal rhythm(N) 3886 32.85 9.70
Atrial Fibrillation(A) 447 32.25 11.98
Other rhythm(O) 1488 35.46 11.56
Noisy signal(∽) 260 24.02 10.42
Success Rate of Targeted Attacks
We select the first 360 segments of class N, class A and class
O respectively, and the first 220 segments of class∽ in attack
dataset to evaluate the success rate of the targeted attacks.
For each ECG segment, we conduct three targeted attacks to
other classes one by one. Thus, we have 12 source-target
pairs given 4 classes. The attack results are shown in Table 3.
With all three similarity metrics, the generated adversar-
ial instances achieve high attack success rates. dl2 fails in a
few instances of some source-target pairs, such as “O→ A”,
“A → N”, “O → N” and “∽ → N”. dsmooth case achieves
almost a 100% success rate and dsmooth,l2 achieves a 100%
success rate. A sample of generated adversarial ECG sig-
nals are shown in Fig. 4. Due to the limited space, we only
show a case where an original atrial fibrillation ECG(A) is
misclassified to a normal rhythm(N). It is noticed that the one
generated with dl2 metric looks more suspicious due to lots
of small spikes, while the dsmooth one preserves more simi-
lar pattern to the original. The property of dsmooth,l2 falls in
between the above two as expected.
Human Perceptual Study
We conduct an extensive human perceptual study on both or-
dinary people and cardiologists to evaluate the imperceptibil-
ity of adversarial ECGs.
Ordinary human participants without medical expertise are
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk(AMT). Thus, they
are only required to compare the adversarial examples gen-
erated using different similarity metrics and choose the one
closer to the original ECG. For each similarity metric, we
generate 600 adversarial examples (each source-target pair
accounts for 50 examples). In the study, the participants are
asked to observe an original example and its two adversarial
ones generated using two different similarity metrics. Then
they need to choose one of the two adversarial examples that
is closer to the original. The perceptual study comprises three
parts, (i) dsmooth versus dl2, (ii) dsmooth,l2 versus dl2, and
(iii) dsmooth versus dsmooth,l2. To avoid labeling bias, we al-
low each user to conduct at most 60 trials for each part. For
each tuple of an original example and its two adversarial ex-
amples, we collect 5 annotations from different participants.
In total, we collected 9000 annotations from 57 AMT users.
The study results are shown in Table 4, where “triumphs” de-
notes the metric got 4 or 5 votes for all 5 annotations, and
“wins” denotes that the metric got 3 votes for 5, i.e., a narrow
victory.
Compared with the dl2-generated examples, the dsmooth-
generated ones are voted closer to the original in 81.34% of
the trials. When comparing dl2 and dsmooth,l2, the latter is
voted as the winner in 84% of the trials. This indicates that
Table 3: Success rates of targeted attacks (Type I Attack)
dl2 dsmooth dsmooth,l2
A N O ∽ A N O ∽ A N O ∽
A / 97.22% 100% 100% / 100% 100% 100% / 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 100% / 100% 100% 100% / 100% 100% 100% / 100% 100%
O 99.44% 95.0% / 100% 99.72% 100% / 100% 100% 100% / 100%
∽ 100% 99.55% 100% / 100% 100% 100% / 100% 100% 100% /
Table 4: Human perceptual study (AMT participants)
i
dsmooth wins(%) dl2 wins(%)
triumphs wins total triumphs wins total
58.67 22.67 81.34 10 8.66 18.66
ii
dsmooth,l2 wins(%) dl2 wins(%)
triumphs wins total triumphs wins total
65.5 18.5 84 7.83 8.17 16
iii
dsmooth wins(%) dsmooth,l2 wins(%)
triumphs wins total triumphs wins total
31.83 27.83 59.67 15.83 24.5 40.33
the smoothness metric encourages generated adversarial ex-
amples preserve similar patterns to original ones, so they are
more likely to be imperceptible. When comparing dsmooth
and dsmooth,l2, dsmooth get a few more votes (59.67%) than
dsmooth,l2, which further validates that the smoothness met-
ric better qualifies human similarity perception on line curves
than L2 norm.
Besides participants on AMT, we also invite three cardi-
ologists to evaluate whether added perturbations arouse their
suspicion. The cardiologists are asked to classify the given
ECG and its adversarial counterparts into 4 classes(A, N, O,
∽) based on their medical expertise. We focus on the cases of
“N→ A”, “N→ O”, “A→ N”, “O→ N”, which misclassify
a normal rhythm to an arrhythmia or vise versa. For the above
4 source-target pairs, we randomly select 6 type N, 3 type A
and 3 type O, then we generate adversarial examples with dif-
ferent similarity metrics. Thus, we have 48 samples (original
and adversarial ones) and shuffle them randomly. For every
sample, we collect annotations from all three cardiologists.
The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Human Perceptual Study (Cardiologists)
Idx Original dl2 dsmooth dsmooth,l2
1 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 91.7% 100% 100% 100%
3 100% 100% 100% 100%
Each row refers to one cardiologist. The first column
denotes the percentage of the cardiologist’s annotations the
same as the labels in PhyDB dataset. Only one cardiologist
annotates a type A instance as type O. The last three columns
show the percentage of adversarial examples which are anno-
tated the same type as their original counterparts. The results
show that in all cases, cardiologists give the same annotations
to adversarial examples as their original counterparts. The
possible reason is that most perturbations generally occur on
the wave valley, but the cardiologists give annotations based
on the peak-to-peak intervals. They think the subtle pertur-
bations possibly caused by instrument noise. The results that
adversarial signals can be correctly classified by cardiologists
but wrongly classified by the classifier prove that our attacks
successfully fool the classifier to disable its function of diag-
nosis assistance without arousing human suspicion.
5.2 Evaluation for Type II Attack
Success Rate of Targeted Attacks
We implement our attack strategy for Type II attack under
the framework of CleverHans [Papernot et al., 2018]. We
maximize the objective function using the Adam [Kingma
and Ba, 2014] optimizer, and approximate the gradient of the
expected value through independently sampling transforma-
tions at each gradient decent step. Among 12 source-target
pairs, we randomly choose 10 samples of each pair to gener-
ate adversarial perturbations by applying the attack strategy
in Section 4.2. It is worth mentioning that we generate one
perturbation from one sample. Thus, we have 10 perturba-
tions from 10 samples respectively. Then we apply the above
perturbations to 100 randomly-chosen samples of the corre-
sponding source class to see whether the adversarial examples
could mislead the classifier universally. Before adding pertur-
bations to the target sample, we apply a filter on the perturba-
tions to test the filtering-resistance. The filter has two choices:
Filter 1 is the rectangular filter that removes the signal with
frequency of lower than 0.05Hz and 50/60Hz. Filter 2 is
the combination of two common filters used in ECG signal
processing, a high-pass butterworth filter with 0.05Hz cutting
frequency and notch filters for 50/60Hz power line noises. To
mimic the sample point uncertainty of the on-the-fly signals,
we generate the perturbation at full length which meanswd is
equal to 9000. Then we randomly shift perturbations and add
them to the original signals. In this evaluation, we randomly
shift the perturbations 200 times for testing. The average suc-
cess rates are shown in Table 6. The row is the origin class
and the column is the target class. In one cell The top suc-
cess attack rate is for filter 1 and the bottom is for filter 2.
Our attack strategy achieves pretty high success rates, which
indicates that the generated perturbation is filtering-resistant,
skewing-resistant and universal.
Figure 4: A sample of generated adversarial ECG signal.
Figure 5: Success attack rates with different sized win-
dows.
Table 6: Success rates of targeted attacks (Type II Attack)
A N O ∽
A /
99.97%/
99.96%
99.82%/
99.86%
100%/
100%
N
100%/
100%
/
100%/
100%
99.83%/
99.75%
O
100%/
100%
99.76%/
99.73%
/
100%/
100%
∽
100%/
100%
97.63%/
97.45%
98.70%/
98.76%
/
Impact of Window Size
In this section, we evaluate the success attack rates with dif-
ferent sized windows wd. As mentioned before, the smaller
the window size, the lower the chance that the attacker can
be perceived. In this evaluation, we generate perturbations
on different sized windows 9000,7500,6000,4500,3000 and
1500. For each window size, we generate adversarial ex-
amples under the same conditions as the previous section –
randomly 10 samples for 12 source-target pairs. Then we ap-
ply filters, shift the perturbation randomly and add it to other
samples from the original source class. The results are shown
in Figure 5. The legend is the target class under different
filters. In most cases, the success rate decreases a lot when
the window size increases. However, they slowly decrease
and even remain almost unchanged under the cases of “A→
O”, “N → O” and “∽→ O”. All these cases are from a cer-
tain class to class O. This is mainly because class O (refers
to other abnormal arrhythmia except atrial fibrillation) may
cover an expansive input space so that it is easier to misclas-
sify an other class to class O. Besides, we find that except for
class O, the success rate decrease more slowly when the tar-
get class is A. The possible reason is the inherent property of
class A, i.e., if a certain part of the ECG signal is regraded as
atrial fibrillation, then the whole ECG segment will be classi-
fied as class A. The success attack rates under different filters
are quite similar, which shows the filtering-resistance of our
generated perturbations.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes ECGadv to generate adversarial ECG ex-
amples to misguide arrhythmia classification systems. The
existing attacks in image domain could not be directly appli-
cable due to the distinct properties of ECGs in visualization
and dynamic properties. We analyze the properties of ECGs
to design effective attacks schemes under two attacks mod-
els respectively. Our results demonstrate the blind spots of
DNN-powered diagnosis systems under adversarial attacks to
call attention to adequate countermeasures.
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